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Abstract
Financial contagion is often observed in recent financial crisis, which illustrates a critical need
for new and fundamental understanding of its dynamics. So in this paper we mainly focus on
modeling and analysing the financial contagion in a system where a large number of financial
institutions are randomly connected by the direct balance sheets linkages own to the lending or
borrowing relationships. We propose a simple contagion algorithm to study the effect of
several determinants, such as the topology of financial network, exposure ratio, leverage ratio,
and the liquidation ratio. One of our finding is that the financial contagion is weaker as the
growth of connectivity of network, so a financial system with a higher connectivity is more
stability or robustness; we also find that the exposure ratio increases the risk of financial
contagion, but both the leverage ratio and liquidation ratio has a negative relationship on
financial contagion.
Keywords: Financial Contagion, contagion algorithm, Financial System, Random Network,
Financial stability, Systemic Risk.

Introduction
A crucial characteristic for the recent financial crisis is the contagion (or avalanche effect) of
distress/failure, which is the potential of shocks hitting particular financial institutions to
quickly spread across the whole financial system. For example, the default of Lehman
Brothers on 15 September 2008, triggers a series of bankruptcy of firms in the financial
system of USA, even in other countries. Many economists are attracted by this contagion
phenomenon and produce a wealth of studies. Particularly, the using of network theory is the
prominent direction. Indeed, the financial system can be viewed as a network with highly
connected structure by interdependencies because of financial innovation—those
interdependencies can be in the form of obligation, exposure, ownership and correlation [1].
Building on these interdependencies, the intertwined financial network and the diversified
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financial institution can not only offer an explanation for the spread of crisis throughout the
network, but also offer an implication for policy actions such as government intervention and
bailout. These interdependent relationships, initially build-up with the purpose of risk sharing,
have also created a channel of spreading of financial distress. Like what [2] said, the financial
network exhibits a knife-edge, or robust-yet-fragile property: in normal times the
interdependencies between institutions enhance the liquidity allocation and increased risk
sharing[3]; however, in financial distress time, the same interdependencies can amplify initial
shocks lead to the insolvency of a large number of institutions or even the collapse of the
whole network [4, 5].
However, the study of the nature and causes of financial contagion reflects the uncertainty
and conflicting views from the academic literatures. For example, in the paper of [3] and [6],
the authors argue that with the financial network becoming more dense, the impact of shocks
of individual institutions to the rest system is becoming small, as the losses of an distressed
individual bank are divided into more creditors, However, In contrast to this view, Blume,
Easley et al.[7] and Vivier-Lirimont [8] argue that the frangibility of a financial network is
increase when the number of the counterparties of a bank is growing. This situation illustrates
a critical need for new and fundamental understanding and analysis of financial contagion. So
in this paper we mainly focus on modeling and analysing the financial contagion in a financial
system where a large number of financial institutions are connected by the direct balance
sheets linkages own to the lending or borrowing relationships. In this financial network an
institution interacts with serval other institutions, and so the default of one institution as some
idiosyncratic shocks will affect its creditors, the creditors which are insolvent will also suffer
default and cause further failures in the financial system. A number of determinants influence
this kind of financial contagion, such as the topology of financial network, the size of
exposures, and the capital buffer. We model this kind of financial contagion and propose a
simple contagion algorithm to study the role of these determinants. In detail, focusing on a
financial system with n banks randomly connected, we take the initial idiosyncratic shock as
exogenous, and investigate and analyse how it spreads through different financial networks;
we also study how it is absorbed or amplified by different size of exposures and the capital
buffer. Our contribution is to the ongoing debate on the role of financial integration and
diversification in the spreading of financial contagion.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review
of relevant literature on the application of network theory to the study of financial contagion;
Section 3 introduces the contagion mechanism and the algorithm; Section 4 presents the
results of simulation experiments; Section 5 concludes.

Literature Review
Even financial crises have been frequently witnessed throughout the twentieth century, it is in
recent times, following the global financial collapse as the Subprime Crisis of 2008-2009, that
the network theory have been extensively employed to study financial contagion by
economists and financial regulators [9-11]. The seminal literature of [3] pioneer this strand of
theoretical study by showing how the network structure affects the risk sharing, they point out
that the complete network can absorb idiosyncratic shocks, while the complete network might
allow negative spillovers to spread throughout the system (financial contagion). After this
outstanding work, a large number of literatures on financial contagion employ network or
graph model. Financial contagion mainly comes through three mechanisms: 1), correlation
risk because of overlapping portfolios exposure [12-15]; 2) liquidity hoarding risk because of
rumor or imperfect information [5, 16, 17]; and 3), counterparty risk because of the direct
bilateral exposures[9, 18-21]. We mainly focus on the third mechanism in which the bilateral
exposures are the direct balance sheets linkages in the form of lending or borrowing
relationships. Indeed, these lending or borrowing relationships can be act as a channel of
spreading of contagion.
We broadly categorize the study of financial contagion into two branches, the first branch
is considering financial system as random network, which emphasize the importance of
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network topology structure, such as network connectivity, average degree and density. Those
kinds of literatures model financial contagion as a result from an initial idiosyncratic shock to
one or few financial institutions and spreading through the entire network in a cascade manner.
This group of literatures includes the work of [4, 9, 18, 19, 22]. The other branch is studying
the financial contagion in a deterministic network, which considers the financial network as
either exogenous or endogenous and examines the impact of initial defaults as predetermined
by network externalities, such as the configuration model[23], the tiering banking
network[24], nested split graph[25].
The above mentioned theoretical literatures investigate the mechanism and influence of
financial contagion under a series of determinants by some stylized model and a series of
assumptions. There is an obvious shortcoming of such brands of research, as what Upper said:
“analytical results on the relationship between market structure and contagion have been
obtained only for a limited number of highly stylized structures of interbank markets, which
are of limited use when it comes to assessing the scope for contagion in real world banking
systems”[26]. “Given the scarcity of theoretical results, researchers have increasingly turned
to computer simulations to study contagion”, actually, Upper presents an comprehensive
review on using numerical simulations to study the mechanics of financial contagion in the
paper of[27]. Here we also list some paper on simulation in recent year, [5, 9, 12, 18, 19, 2835].

Financial Network and Balance Sheet
Here we consider a financial system in which n financial institutions (banks for short) are
randomly connected together by their exposures on each other. These exposures which reflect
the lending or borrowing relationships in this financial system can be represented by a
weighted directed network, denoted by an exposure matrix𝐖 ∈ ℝ𝐧×𝐧. In this network, each
node is a bank and each link represents a directional lending relationship between two banks,
the weight reflects the size of exposure which comprises assets as well as liabilities on other
side. We should highlight that the magnitude of these exposures is important for study
financial contagion. The exposure matrix W is defined as follow, where 𝒘𝒊𝒋 denotes the size
of lending by Bank i to bank j, ( 𝒊, 𝒋 ∈ 𝑵, 𝑵 = {𝟏, 𝟐, … , 𝒏}), 𝒘𝒊𝒋 ≠ 𝟎 reflects the presence of a
link, while 𝒘𝒊𝒋 = 𝟎 reflects the absence of a link.
𝟎
𝒘𝟐𝟏
𝑾=[
⋮
𝒘𝒏𝟏

𝒘𝟏𝟐
𝟎
⋮
𝒘𝒏𝟐

⋯ 𝒘𝟏𝒏
⋯ 𝒘𝒏𝟐
]
𝒘𝒊𝒋 ⋮
⋯ 𝟎

Now we turn to consider the structure of assets and liabilities for individual bank. Figure
1 shows a stylized balance sheet for a financial institution. On the assets side of figure 1, the
bank lends to other banks in the financial system, which form the “Internal Assets”, the
remainder of assets consists a range of “External Assets” which are the holdings of other real
economy, such as government bonds, mortgages, corporate lending and commercial real
estate lending. On the other side of the balance sheet, the liabilities consists of the “Deposits”
and “Internal Liabilities”, the deposits is held to be external outside of the system, as such
household, internal liabilities is the borrowing from other banks, the “Equity” is the capital
buffer which denotes the excess of total assets over total liabilities.
Considering the exposure matrix W, we can calculate the total exposures of bank i to the
financial system. The “Internal Assets” held by i, which is denoted by 𝑨𝑰𝒊 , can be got based
on 𝑨𝑰𝒊 = ∑𝒋 𝒘𝒊𝒋 ; and The “Internal Liabilities” 𝑳𝑰𝒊 can be got based on 𝑳𝑰𝒊 = ∑𝒋 𝒘𝒋𝒊 .
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Fig. 1. Stylized Balance Sheet for a Financial Institution (Bank)

Since an internal asset of one bank is an internal liability of another bank, so the internal
liabilities are endogenously determined based on the topology of the financial network,
besides, the equation of (1) could be obtained.
∑ 𝑨𝑰𝒊 = ∑ 𝑳𝑰𝒊 = 𝑺
𝒊

(𝟏)

𝒊

We define the total of internal assets as S, which provide a measure of the total risk
exposures of the financial system. Considering the structure of balance sheet, the following
equations are found.
𝑨𝒊 = 𝑨𝑬𝒊 + 𝑨𝑰𝒊

(𝟐)

𝑳𝒊 = 𝑳𝑰𝒊 + 𝑫𝒊 + 𝑬𝒊

(𝟑)

𝑨𝒊 = 𝑳𝒊

(𝟒)

Where 𝑨𝒊 , 𝑳𝒊 , 𝑨𝑬𝒊 , 𝑫𝒊 and 𝑬𝒊 denote bank i’s total assets, total liabilities, external assets,
deposits and equity, respectively.
What’s more, we introduce two ratios. The exposure ratio, which denotes as 𝜶𝒊, is the rate
of internal assets to the total assets ( 𝜶𝒊 = 𝑨𝑰𝒊 ⁄𝑨𝒊 ) The exposure ratio reflects the risk
exposures of bank i; The leverage ratio, which denotes as 𝜷𝒊 , is the rate of equity to total
assets (𝜷𝒊 = 𝑬𝒊 ⁄𝑨𝒊 ), this leverage ratio is also named as “capital ratio” or “the ratio of net
worth”, which represents the capacity of absorbing losses while remaining solvent. As we
mentioned, the “Equity” is the excess of total assets over total liabilities, so when the total
liabilities exceed the total assets (𝐄𝐢 ≤ 𝟎 𝐨𝐫 𝛃𝐢 ≤ 𝟎), the bank insolvent.

The Contagion Mechanism
Initial Failures
Here we assume that the initial failures are caused by idiosyncratic shock which happed due
to some credit risks (e.g., frauds) or operation risks (e.g., wrong decision). The idiosyncratic
shock has a bad effect on the external assets of a subset of banks in the financial system
(maybe one or serval banks), in the form of reducing the amount of external assets and hence
causing the default of these banks. It is worth noting that the idiosyncratic shock is not the
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aggregated or correlated shock which influence almost all banks simultaneously in the
financial system. The bank has to liquidate if it is default, while its creditors will lose a
fraction of claims because the liquidation value of a firm is always smaller than its book value.
Formal speaking, a bank i is insolvent when 𝑬𝒊 ≤ 𝟎 because of the reduction of external
assets, which cause the bank to liquidate; the liquidation of bank i induces a loss equal to
𝜸𝒊 𝒘𝒋𝒊 for its counterparty j, where 𝜸𝒊 is the liquidation ratio of bank i. So we define the set of
initially insolvent banks is as follow:
𝒁𝟎 = {𝒊 ∈ 𝑵| 𝜷𝒊 ≤ 𝟎 }

(𝟓)

In this paper, we study the case that the number of set 𝒁𝟎 equal one, which means there is
just one default bank at initial time.
The Contagion Process
Bank 1
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Internal
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Internal

. liabilities
.
. Equity

Internal
Assets

Losses (by A and B)
exceed equity à
Default

Deposits
Internal
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Bank m
Fig. 2. The contagion mechanism

In this financial network, the default of one or several banks may lead to other banks being
insolvency, which generating a cascade effect of default. Figure 2 illustrates the mechanism
of the cascade effect. At some time of this contagion process, bank A and bank B are
insolvent and have to be liquidated, which lead to repay their internal liabilities to bank 1, 2,
3,…,m. Each creditor bank only receive one proportion of its claims, this induce bank 1
suffering a loss which exceed its equity, so bank 1 become insolvent and is to be liquidated in
the subsequent step; besides, bank 3 also become insolvent because that the cumulative losses,
incurred from both bank A and bank B, exceed its equity. It must be worth to note that bank A
and B are not necessary to be liquidated in the same step.
To model the dynamics of default contagion, we suppose that all banks in the network are
initially solvent and that the network is perturbed at time T=0 by the initial failure of one
single bank. Considering the set of initially insolvent banks 𝒁𝟎 , we calculate the set of banks,
which become insolvent at time T=1 due to their claims to initial default bank, based on the
following equations.
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𝒛𝟏 = {𝒊 ∈ 𝑵| 𝑬𝒊 ≤ ∑ (𝟏 − 𝜸𝒋 )𝒘𝒊𝒋 }

(𝟔)

𝒋∈𝒁𝟎

𝒁𝟏 = 𝒁𝟎 ∪ 𝒛𝟏

(𝟕)

Actually, when introduce the initial failure, for bank i, which is not in the set of 𝒁𝟎 , the
internal assets 𝑨𝑰𝒊 = ∑𝒋∈𝒁𝟎 𝜸𝒋 𝒘𝒊𝒋 + ∑𝒋∉𝒁𝟎 𝒘𝒊𝒋 , so the change of internal assets △ 𝑨𝑰𝒊 =
∑𝒋∈𝒁𝟎(𝟏 − 𝜸𝒋 )𝒘𝒊𝒋 . According to equation (2), (3), (4), we can obtain that bank i will be
insolvent when 𝑬𝒊 ≤ ∆𝑨𝑰𝒊 .
Following this procedure, we can calculate the set of default banks at time T=t based on
𝒁𝒕−𝟏 .
𝒛𝒕 = {𝒊 ∈ 𝑵| 𝑬𝒊 ≤ ∑ (𝟏 − 𝜸𝒋 )𝒘𝒊𝒋 }

(𝟖)

𝒋∈𝒁𝒕−𝟏

𝒁𝒕 = 𝒁𝒕−𝟏 ∪ 𝒛𝒕

(𝟗)

Iterating the equation of 8 and 9, we can trace the contagion process initialed by one
single bank (#𝒁𝟎 = 𝟏). The process will terminate when 𝒁𝒕 = 𝒁𝒕−𝟏 .
A Simple Contagion Algorithm
This contagion process can be study by the tool of branching process which is widely used in
the field of epidemiology for study the epidemic spreading[36]. Indeed there are some
scholars adopt the branching process to study the probability of financial contagion or the
extent of contagion [4]. However, there are several challenges for the theoretical analysis of
financial contagion. Firstly, the structures of balance sheet for banks are diversity. The size of
total assets, the leverage ratio, the exposures ratio and the in-degree and out-degree for
different bank may be different. Secondly, the branching process usually occurs on a tree, but
the financial contagion not necessarily a tree, but is rather a more general graph. Take the
default of bank 3 as we illustrate in figure 2 as example. The default of either bank A or bank
B will not induce the default of bank 3, but the default of both bank A and bank B can induce
its default. Considering these challenges, we turn to simulation study of financial contagion
with the following contagion algorithm.
Step 1: Introducing the initial failures. Random selecting one bank for default, so the size
of the set of initially insolvent banks equal one (#𝒁𝟎 = 𝟏);
Step 2: Liquidating the default bank. Only repaying one proportional of internal liabilities
for the default bank (𝜸𝒊 𝒘𝒋𝒊 );
Step 3: Revising banks’ balance sheets. Mainly focusing on the creditors for default banks
and revising these creditors’ balance sheets based on equations (2), (3), (4);
Step 4: Updating the set of default banks. Calculating the set of default banks Zt based on
equations (8), (9).
Step 5: Terminating this algorithm if 𝒁𝒕 = 𝒁𝒕−𝟏 , otherwise returning to step 2.

Simulation Experiments and Results
Parameters Setting
The algorithm mentioned above makes it possible to study the contagion process in a financial
system when it is in a particular state, corresponding to a particular configuration of the
network topology and the balance sheets for each bank. Our main goals are to understand
whether and how the financial contagion depends on the network properties and the structure
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of balance sheets. At the first step, we should make some specific instruction for the network
topology and balance sheets.
Table 1. Summary of the variation for parameters

Parameter
Network topology
Random
N
Network
𝑷𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒎
Balance Sheet Structure
𝜶
𝜷
The liquidation ratio
𝜸

Description

variation

The number of nodes in a financial network
The probability of forming a link between two nodes
The exposure ratio/the internal-assets-to-assets ratio

1000(fixed)
0.01 to 0.30

The leverage ratio/ the equity-to assets ratio

0.2 to 0.4
0.01 to 0.05

The repaying ratio for each internal liabilities

0 to 0.4

The financial network be studied is Erdös and Rényi random graph[37]. The random
graph model can be defined by two parameters: N disconnected nodes and the probability P
for forming a link between each couple of nodes, the link formation process is i.i.d. and the
degree distribution is binomial. Based on this definition, we can construct a series of financial
systems which comprises 1000 banks, the lending or borrowing relationships in the financial
system is represented by the weight in the network, the weight is assigned according to the
discovery of the paper of [38], in which the weight follows a Log-Normal distribution with
mean 15.2 and standard deviation of 0.8.
Now turn to the structure of balance sheet, we assume that all banks have the same
exposures and leverage in a financial network, but difference in different networks. So in a
financial network, we set the exposure ratio and leverage ratio for all banks are the same 𝜶
and 𝜷, respectively. We can determine the detail information for each bank’s balance sheet,
such as, total assets, equity and deposits, based on the confirming of internal assets , internal
liabilities 𝜶 and 𝜷.
In a nutshell, a financial system is determined by the matrix W, exposure ratio α and
leverage ratio 𝜷. So the diversification of the financial system is reflected by the variation of
these parameters. Table 1 summary these variation which are considered in our simulation
study. It is worth noting that we also assume that all banks in the same financial system have
the same liquidation ratio.
Finally, in order to evaluate the magnitude of financial contagion, we introduce two
measure indicators. At first, we define financial contagion as an event that at least one bank
falls into default as a response to the initial failure. Following this definition, two measure
indicators are derived: 1), contagion probability, defined as the probability of occurring of a
contagion event (equation 10); 2), extent of contagion, defined as the average banks being
defaulted induced by the initial failure if a contagion event occurs (equation 11). The
contagion probability and the extent of contagion are suitable for measuring the magnitude of
financial contagion, reflecting the stability or the robustness of a financial system. Particularly,
contagion probability reflects the sensibility of a financial system for suffering financial
contagion, while the extent of contagion reflects the fragility of a financial system. In the
following subsections, we present the computational results which are performed 1000
simulations based on these two measure indicators.
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 =
𝑬𝒙𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 =

𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔

(15)

𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒆𝒇𝒂𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒚 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒅

(𝟏𝟔)
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The Probability P and Contagion
We first investigate the effect of probability P, which denotes the probability of forming link
between each couple of nodes when constructing a financial network. Figure 3 shows the
changing of the contagion probability and extent of contagion under the varying of the
probability P, here we also vary the leverage ratio 𝜷 from 0.01 to 0.05. Our first finding is
that both the contagion probability and the extent of contagion decrease as the increasing of
probability P, regardless of the varying of 𝜷 . Especially, there is a sharp drop when
probability P varying approximately from 0.05 to 0.2. Moreover, considering the same
probability P, we observe that a higher value of leverage ratio 𝜷, the lower value for the
contagion probability as well as the extent of contagion. These observations show the
negative influence of the probability P and leverage ratio 𝜷 on the financial contagion.
1
β=0.01
β=0.02
β=0.03
β=0.04
β=0.05

0.9

0.8

1000

β=0.01
β=0.02
β=0.03
β=0.04
β=0.05

800

The Extent of Contagion

The Contagion Probability

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

600

400

200

0.2

0.1
0
0
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

The Probability P

0.25

0.3

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

The Probability P

Fig. 3. The influence of probability P on financial contagion

This negative relationship between probability P and financial contagion can be
understand as follow: for a random network, the average degree is approximately (𝑵 − 𝟏)𝑷.
So the average degree is increase as the growing of the probability P, which reflects a higher
level of connectivity of the network; the high level of connectivity denotes the shock of
defaulted banks can be shared or absorbed by more banks, so the contagion probability and
the extent of contagion are small. We conclude that a higher value of probability P, which
denotes the financial system is more stability, the lower probability of contagion and the
lower of the extent of contagion. Turn to the negative relationship between leverage ratio 𝜷
and financial contagion, the intuition is simple: higher value of leverage ratio 𝜷 reflects
higher capital buffer which act as a cushion, this situation denotes that banks can absorb more
risk induced by other banks. This also leads us to conclude that the financial system with high
leverage ratio is more robustness, because of the negative influence on financial contagion.
Exposure Ratio and Contagion
Figure 4 reports the effect of exposure ratio on financial contagion. We find that both the
contagion probability and the extent of contagion increase as the growing of exposure ratio,
for example, when leverage ratio 𝜷 equals 0.03, the contagion probability is changing
approximately from 0.18 to 0.67, and the extent of contagion is changing from 0 to 400. The
probable reason is following: the increasing of exposure ratio reflects the growing of risk for
banks, because high exposure ratio denotes more assets are hold by other banks. From another
perspective, the exposure ratio measures the concentration of bank’s asset, higher exposure
ratio reflects lower concentration, so induce higher influence on it when failure hits the banks’
counterparty.
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Fig. 4. The influence of exposure ratio on financial contagion

However, there are two special cases. The first case is the situation that the leverage ratio
𝜷 equals 0.01, the contagion probability is always 1 and the extent of contagion is almost 100,
although the exposure ratio is varying from 0.2 to 0.4, the reason is that the financial network
is so fragile that can’t bear any shocks because of low leverage ratio. The other case is that the
leverage ratio 𝜷 equals 0.04 or 0.05, although there is a distinct changing for the contagion
probability, the extent of contagion has almost no changings, this situation induces that the
financial contagion can occur but the extent is very small. The underlying reason is obvious,
the high leverage ratio denotes the high level of stability of the financial network, which
reflects the initial idiosyncratic shock can be absorbed during the first few contagion process.
Liquidation Ratio and Contagion
We finally investigate the effect of liquidation ratio on financial contagion. The liquidation
ratio reflects the repaying proportion for internal liabilities when bank needs to liquidate. The
liquidation ratio also can be considered as a measure of the magnitude of the shocks: a higher
liquidation ratio, the lower magnitude of the shock, because high liquidation ratio reflects
more internal liabilities can be repaid.
Figure 5 shows the changing of the contagion probability and extent of contagion under
the varying of the liquidation ratio. We can find that both the contagion probability and extent
of contagion decrease due to the increasing of liquidation ratio. As discussed above, the
reason is that high liquidation denotes the magnitude of shock is small, so the financial
contagion can’t spread further. Of course, there are also two special cases, one is that the
financial system is fragile when the leverage ratio 𝜷 equals 0.01, where the contagion
probability and the extent of contagion are almost 1 and 1000, respectively; the other is the
situation that financial system is stability when leverage ratio 𝜷 equals 0.04 or 0.05, where the
extent of contagion is almost zero.
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Fig.5. The influence of liquidation ratio on financial contagion

Discussion and Conclusion
Indeed, during the past few decades, global financial systems have seen considerable growth
in size, complexity and diversification. However, it is our understanding of the mechanism of
such systems that has not necessarily kept pace. On the other hand, the recent financial crisis
has made a profound demonstration that modern financial systems can amplify and
disseminate financial distress on a global scale. Motivated these situations, in this paper we
analyse how the topology of financial network and the balance sheet structure affect financial
contagion, which is evaluated by the contagion probability and the extent of contagion, by
simulation study based on a simple contagion algorithm. We find that the financial contagion
is weaker as the growth of connectivity of the network in the form of increasing probability P,
a high level of connectivity denotes the shock of defaulted banks can be shared or absorbed
by more counterparties, so a financial system with a higher probability P is more stability or
robustness. For the structure of balance sheet which is determined by exposure ratio α and
leverage ratio 𝜷 , we find that exposure ratio has a positive relationship with financial
contagion, but a negative relationship for leverage ratio and financial contagion. The exposure
ratio measures the concentration of bank’s asset, higher exposure ratio reflects lower
concentration, this situation induces that bank exposes more risk to its counterparty. The
leverage ratio determines the magnitude of bank’s capital buffer which reflects the capacity of
absorbing shocks. Finally we investigates the role of liquidation ratio, which evaluates the
magnitude of the shocks, on financial contagion, the results show that both the contagion
probability and extent of contagion decrease due to the increasing of liquidation ratio.
Our study partly clarifies the interplay between the network topology and financial
integration in the disseminating financial contagion. Besides, this study also provides
implications for regulation of financial system. For example, the regulation of financial
stability should not only seek to minimize the risk of failure of individual institutions, but also
should focus on the whole financial system. In detail, the strategy of diversification indeed
looks like sensible for sharing risk from the perspective of individual institutions—eggs are
placed in more baskets; however the diversification may not optimal being viewed from
systemic perspective, even can generate a bad result.
However, some factors are not taken into account in this study. For a financial network,
we assume that banks are randomly connected, but this may be not true in reality, because
banks lend or borrow money depend on many factors, such as bank’s credit. So the network
topology may be not determined by random connection, for example, Chinazzi, Fagiolo et al
find a core-periphery structure of the International Financial Network (IFN) architecture [39].
Of course, the exposure ratio and leverage ratio also may be not the same for all banks. Those
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factors should be investigated in our future study, what’s more, other interesting problems are
also worth to study, such as how the role of governmental intervention and bailout under
financial crisis, how to response for individual institution to mitigate contagion and so on.
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